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Field Report
Informal Institutions in Hybrid Regimes: the Case of Ukraine
As  my  course  is  primarily  focused  on  Ukraine’s  regime  dynamics  since
independence, I will first situate Ukraine in the current literature on hybrid regimes, then I
will turn to the debate on informal institutions and, finally,  I will contextualize Ukraine’s
regime transformation in light of current debates.
Hybrid Regimes
The so-called “third wave” of democratization took place between the mid-seventies
and early nineties across Latin American and Eastern Europe. Yet, the third wave did not
produce as many democratic regimes as was expected by both theorists and policy makers.
Since then, the entire “transition paradigm” has been seriously questioned. Though the term
“hybrid” has been around for almost a decade1, it was only after the T. Carothers claim2 that
hybrid regimes emerged as a distinct regime type and then a field in comparative politics3. It
was observed that such regimes exist in virtually every part of the world. A growing number
of  studies  suggest  that  these  hybrid  regimes  are  not  transitional  but  instead  display
remarkable stability.  Thus,  although the end of  the Cold War and collapse of  the Soviet
Union triggered a wave of democratization, it also triggered a wave of hybridization. The
fourth wave was as much hybrid as it was democratic4. 
In this section, I present the theoretical and empirical literature on hybrid regimes.
This is not to say, however, that these are two separate areas of research. For the purpose of
this review, I discuss these two areas separately in order to emphasize the major issues with
each.
On the  theoretical  level,  the  primary question is  how to  develop the concept,
extract its attributes and, consequently, build a typology that would clearly separate hybrid
regimes from consolidated autocracy and democracy5. The problem is complicated by the
fact that there is no universal concept of democracy that would serve as a starting point for
both theoretical and empirical studies. On the one hand, there is the minimalist definition ,
which presupposes that democracy encompasses a range of civil liberties such as freedom of
organization, freedom of speech, and freedom of information in addition to free, fair, and
inclusive elections. On the other hand, there is the maximalist definition that, in addition to
the  characteristics  just  listed,  includes  the  absence  of  veto  players  not  legitimized  by
democratic  procedures,  horizontal  accountability,  and  the  rule  of  law.  Though  the  two
definitions are  conceptually  different,  they have two commonalities  that  prevent  scholars
from separating democracy from autocracy, and both of these concepts from the concept of
1 On initial research hybrid regimes, see Karl (1995), Collier and Levitsky (1997), Diamond (2002) 
2 Carothers (2002) observed that most of the post-soviet regimes do not democratize. 
3 On more recent discussion on hybrid regimes see,  Schedler (2002, 2006), Ottaway (2003),
Howard and Roessler (2006)  
4 The term “fourth wave” was introduced by McFaul (2002)
5 See M.Wigell ( 2008), M.Bogaards (2009) J.Ekman (2009) and critics in L.Morlino (2009)
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hybrid regime. As Christian Göbel observed, “first, they are made up of several criteria, and
all of the criteria are necessary elements of a democracy; and second, more problematically,
most of these indicators relate to phenomena that are not either/or conditions but matters of
degree”6.  In  attempting to solve this conceptual  problem scholars  split  into three groups:
those who viewed hybrid regimes as a diminished form of democracy7, those who see them
as incomplete authoritarianism8 and those who consider them a distinct regime type9. Each of
these  groups  has  made  some  progress  in  conceptualizing  regimes  situating  in  between
autocracy and democracy or the “grey zone” phenomenon. 
Thus the meaning of hybridity has undergone at least two transformations. First, it has
been  established  that  hybrid  regimes  are  not  moving only  in  a  democratic  direction  but
follow diverse trajectories in the post Cold-war era10. Second, there has been an attempt to
narrow the concept from a broad, mixed notion of a regime that combines some democratic
and some autocratic elements to a distinct type of regime that holds competitive elections but
possesses some autocratic elements. The precise definition however, is still not agreed upon. 
Which autocratic elements constitute a hybrid regime? Some scholars contend that it
is just one element: clientelism11. Others claim that there more elements, ranging form five
(civil rule, polyarchy,  rule of law, civilizedness,  and political exclusion/inclusion)12 to six
(significant  levels  of  corruption,  lack of democratic  quality,  a problematic  press  freedom
situation, a poor civil liberties situation, and lack of the rule of law)13 to seven (rule of law,
electoral process, functioning of government, political pluralism and participation, freedom
of expression and beliefs, freedom of association and organization, and personal autonomy
and individual freedom)14. Still others do not identify the elements of hybridity, but conceive
it as “alternative system” of governance.15 While still others hold that it is  “…incumbent
abuse of the state (that) violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: 1) free
elections, 2) broad protection of civil liberties, and 3) reasonably level paying filed”16. These
last  three  elements  are  attributed  to  only  one  specific  type  of  hybrid  regime,  called
competitive authoritarianism.  Alongside with the idea of  electoral  authoritarianism17,  the
former has been the most developed concept in recent scholarship on hybrid regimes. As the
above discussion shows, the problem of attributes and typology is yet to be resolved.
The second group of scholars frame hybrid regimes as incomplete authoritarianism.
These  studies  are  less  concerned  with  the  conceptual  issues,  focusing  instead  on  the
dynamics of hybrid regimes. The major theoretical question, shared by virtually all scholars
in this group, is why some regimes democratize, while others do not. A related empirical
question is which hybrid regimes democratize, which fail to democratize and which remain
6 Göbel, Ch.(2010) 
7 See, for example W. Merkel (2004) 
8 See, for example, works by Schedler (2002, 2006) and Levitsky and Way (2010)
9 See discussion on hybrid regimes in L. Morlino (2009)
10 Mc Faul (2002), Carothers(2002), Levitsky and Way (2010)
11 See Hale (forthcoming) 
12 Zinecker (2009) 
13 Ekman (2009) 
14 Morlino (2009)
15 Ottaway (2003)  
16 Levistkty and Way (2010, p.7) 
17 Schedler (2006)
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stable hybrid.  Among dozens of studies written in this field, three works deserve special
attention: Schedler’s (2006) edited volume on electoral authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way’s
(2010)  study  on  competitive  authoritarianism,  and  Hale’s  forthcoming  research  on  the
dynamics of the hybrid regimes in post-communist Eurasia18. 
All  three  studies  share  a  similar  normative view of hybrid  regimes,  placing them
closer to the authoritarian end of the spectrum than to democratic one, and all are interested
in  the  dynamics  of  regimes.  However,  each  study  approaches  regime  dynamics  from  a
different  theoretical  perspective.  While  Schedler  and  colleagues  look  at  the  agents  of
authoritarian elections, Levitsky and Way are more interested in structural factors, namely
linkages  to  the  West,  incumbents’  organizational  power  and  states’  vulnerability  to
democratizing pressure. Hale’s analysis starts with an ambitious claim to “replace the theory
of ideal with the theory of real”19.  By focusing on the “real” he means to develop a tool
capable of explaining the empirical reality of Eurasian polities. This tool is his concept of
patronal presidentialism, which Hale uses to analyze 39 countries. Instead of taking a linear
“to  and  from  democracy”  approach,  Hale  suggests  a  cyclical  vision  for  explaining  the
internal dynamics of these regimes. From this perspective, what we observed in the so-called
“Color Revolutions,” for example, was not a regime change, but normal dynamics of patronal
presidentialism. By analyzing the real  empirical  cases,  Hale tries  to unpack the informal
politics that function through patronal networks. Yet, Hale’s ambition falls short of providing
a real reconstruction. The task is by all means commendable, but it can hardly be completed
by a  single  Western  scholar.  Having no access  to  the data  on  regionl  and local  “power
verticals” Hale was only able the reconstruct networks on the central levels, which makes the
study of patronal networks incomplete. While post-Soviet intellectuals often lack theoretical
and  methodological  clarity  in  analyzing  their  societies,  Western  academics  suffer  from
misunderstanding of local cultures.
Still, taken together, these works represent a new attempt to explain the real dynamics
of  hybrid  regimes  instead  of  focusing  on  purely  conceptual  issues..  Understanding  that
hybridity is not just a mixture of competitive elections with autocratic practices, these studies
attempt to take into consideration informal institutions that dominate the political process.
Informal Institutions
As Hale suggests, one key feature of hybrid regimes is the prevalence of informal
institutions20 over formal institutions. The initial question of the interplay between formal and
informal institutions in façade democracies21 has been gradually reformulated into one, whish
asks why informal institutions often subvert formal institutions in hybrid regimes22. In other
words why elites do not “play by the rules” but play “with the rules.”
           The range of informal institutions is as broad as their functions. Among adaptative,
accommodative, substitutive and conflictive informal institutions, most attention, however,
have  been  given  to  “subversive”  institutions,  or  those  unwritten  rules  of  conduct  which
18 Hale, H. (forthcoming) 
19 Hale (forthcoming, -P.8)
20 Informal institutions, as defined by G.Helmke and S.Levitsky (2004) are socially shared rules,
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned
channels. 
21 See Mayer G. (2008) Merkel W.  Croissant A. (2000) 
22 Гельман В. (2010)    
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circumscribe the actors’ (elites and business interests) behavior in pursuing private gains.
These include the president’s  extra-constitutional nomination to public and administrative
positions, clientalism and patronage, unofficial deals between political actors ranging from
electoral strategies to constitutional agreements, and state capture.    
In recent years, there have been several major contributions to these questions. One
notable example is Gerd Mayer’s (2008) edited volume on informal politics in Central and
Eastern Europe23. Focusing on two processes – personalization of politics and the building of
democratic  legitimacy  –  the  authors  examine  four  cases:  Hungary,  Poland,  Russia  and
Ukraine.  Ukraine is  categorized as neo-patrimonial  state.  In  a  discussion of the interplay
between formal and informal rules in Ukraine, Kerstin Zimmer asserts that formal rules are
purposefully designed in such a way that informal,  clientelistic practices must be used in
order to make the system functional24. This thesis is exemplified in the relationship between
central state and the regional and local administrations. Other scholars have also expressed an
interest in Ukraine’s meso-level  politics in comparison with other countries25. 
Clientelism is  the most  studied example of informal  subversive practices26.  In  the
Ukrainian context, however, it has not been studied systematically. Instead research focuses
on clientelistic relations is such spheres as elections27, regional politics 28 or corruption29.
Putting Ukraine in Context
My project  seeks to contribute to the question of endurance of hybrid  regimes by
focusing on informal institutions (primarily clientelistic networks and informal deals among
elites) as they operate in the Ukrainian context. Ukraine is a spectacular example of a hybrid
regime, where formal institutions (state and constitution) are weak, and informal ones are
quite  strong.  The dominance  of informal over  formal institutions in Ukraine makes it  an
excellent case for analyzing the country’s transition in a comparative context.
Ukraine’s case is quite interesting in at least two other respects. First, the context of
political change in Ukraine considerably differs not only from the countries of East-Central
Europe, but also from most of the post-Soviet states30. The legacy of Soviet rule, and the
problems of market economy formation and state and nation building, are much deeper here
than in the countries of East-Central Europe. Secondly, while the transition period in Baltic
and most Eastern European countries has finished, the major theoretical question is whether
Ukraine will eventually become a liberal democracy, remain a “hybrid regime,” or backslide
to full authoritarianism. 
Beginning with T. Carothers’s “The Gray Zone” 31metaphor, there have been several
23 Mayer G. (2008) 
24 Zimmer K. (2008) 
25 Matsuzato (2005) 
26 On recent resent on clientelism see, Kitchelt H., Wilkinson S. (2007); Helmke and Levitsky
(2006)
27  Birch, S. (1997) 
28 Matsuzato (2001, 2002)
29 Darden K. (2002) 
30
 See the works of B.Harasymiw (2002), P.D’Anieri (2006),  T.Kuzio (2008). 
31 Carothers T. (2002) 
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concepts ranging from “Competitive Authoritarianism”32 and “Patronal Presidentialism”33 to
“The  Institutional  Trap”34 and  “Immobile  State”35 to  describe  the  dynamics  of  hybrid
regimes. While the former models are insightful accounts of the mechanism of reproduction
and functional deficiency of hybrid regimes, they do not explain the dominance of informal
over formal institutions in Ukraine. Or in other words, the endurance of a hybrid regime for
almost twenty years. The concept of the institutional trap as applied to Russia seems to better
address the question of why Ukraine is an immobile state and its transition is so muddled.   
As I am focusing on the interplay of formal and informal institutions in Ukraine and
trying to assess the role of clientelism in shaping actors behavior, I would like to incorporate
the contribution of neo–institutionalism into the study of Ukraine’s transition. I am trying to
reconstruct the cleintelistic networks under Kuchma, Yushechenko and Yanukovych at the
central,  regional  and,  possibly,  local  levels   and  explain  why Kuchma  was  not  able  to
consolidate  his  power,  why  Ukraine  has  not  succeeded  in  democratization  under
Yushchenko, and why the regime has become quasi-authoritarian under Yanukovych. 
Instances of political  actions that go beyond the officially sanctioned channels are
assumed to be circumscribed by informal rules. These rules are part of the empirical base of
my research. However, uncovering them is not an easy thing, which creates a methodological
problem I hope to address. In practical terms, this type of research involves description and
interpretation of any political decision intended to obtain something other than public gains.
The most visible instances are the excessive use of authority by major political players, or
“Rule  by  Law,”  building  and  sustaining  clientelistic  and  patronal  networks,  the  use  of
“administrative resource,” nepotism, blackmail and political corruption.
Objectives:
My primary intent in participating in this workshop was to develop a syllabus on
Ukraine’s transition in a comparative perspective. Now I would like to offer a new course in
which I integrate my own research on the dynamics of Ukraine’s regime since independence
with the latest theoretical and empirical studies of post-communist transformation. Intensive
communication with a  team of  local  scholars  put  me in a  better  position with regard to
teaching,  methodology,  and  content,  which  I  have  already  shared  with  colleagues  and
students at my home university. 
The secondary objective was more research oriented.  By discussing my initial model
of Ukraine’s regime transformation with local scholars at Berkeley and Stanford,  I had a
chance to broaden my theoretical foundations and refine basic concepts and variables.
Not less important to me was to meet local faculty who are doing research and/or
teaching at Berkeley and Stanford. This gave me an opportunity to broaden my professional
contacts  on a  personal  and institutional  level.  After  presenting a course to the Ukrainian
students I would like to apply for a teaching and research fellowship at one of the overseas
universities with a good school of Ukrainian or Eastern European Studies, where I  could
complete my habilitation research, while teaching a course on Ukraine’s transition. 
Selected Reading List
32 Levitsky S.,Way L.(2002)
33 Hale H. (2005)
34 Gelman V., (2011)
35 Kuzio T.,  (2011) 
5
Bogaards, M. 2009: “How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral
authoritarianism”, Democratization,16 (2)., 399 – 423.
Birch, S. 1997: “Nomenclatura Democratization: Electoral Clientelism in
Post-Soviet Ukraine” Democratization 4(4), 40-62.
Collier, D. & S. Levitsky. 1997: “Democracy with Adjectives. Conceptual Innovation in
Comparative Research”, World Politics,  49 (3),  430-451.
Carothers, T. 2002: The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy  13(1)
Darden, K. 2002: “Graft and governance: corruption as an informal mechanism of state
control”, paper presented at conference Informal Institutions and Politics in the Developing
Worlds, Harvard University, April 5-6 
D’Anieri, P..2006: Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional
Design. M.E. Sharpe.
D’Anieri, P. 2005: “What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of
the Orange Revolution,” Problems of Post-Communism 52.
Diamond, L. 2002: “Thinking about hybrid regimes”, Journal of Democracy 13(2), 25–31. 
Ekman, J., 2009: “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing
Hybrid Regimes”, International Political Science Review, 30(1), 7-31 
 
Gelman, V., 2011: Institutional Trap in Russian Politics. Still no way out? PONARS Eurasia
Policy Memo No. 151, available on line
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_151.pdf
Гельман, В. 2010: “«Подрывные» институты и неформальное управление в
современной России” Полития, 2 (57)
Göbel, C. 2010: "Semiauthoritarianism."  In: 21st Century Political Science: A Reference
Handbook. SAGE Publications.
Harasymiw, B. 2002: Post-Soviet Ukraine. Edmonton: CIUS Press.  
Howard, M. M. and Roessler, P. G. 2006: “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive
Authoritarian Regimes”. American Journal of Political Science 50 (2)
 
Hale, H. (forthcoming) Great Expectations: Regime Dynamics in Eurasia and Beyond
Hale, H. 2011: “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics. Institutions and Democratization
in Post-Soviet Eurasia” World Politics, 63 (4)
6
Hale, H. 2005: “Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet
Eurasia” World Politics 58(1)
Helmke, G.,Levitsky, S. 2004: ,, Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research
Agenda”  Perspectives on Politics, 2(4)
Helmke, G., Levitsky, S. 2006: Introduction, in: Helmke, Gretchen/Levitsky,
Steven /eds.): Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Karl, T. 1990: “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 23,
1–21.
Kitchelt H., Wilkinson S. 2007: (eds.) Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic
accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kuzio, T. 2000: Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence. St.Martin’s Press. New York.
Kuzio, T. 2011: “Political Culture and Democracy. Ukraine as an Immobile State”. East
European Politics and Societies 25(1)
Kubicek, P. 2000: Unbroken Ties: The State, Interest associations, and Corporatism in Post-
Soviet Ukraine. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.
Levitsky, S.,Way L., 2002: “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”  Journal of
Democracy, 13(2),51-65.
Levitsky S., Way L. 2010: Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold
War, Cambridge University Press
Mayer, G. (ed.) 2008: Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern
Europe. 2nd  revised and updated edition. Barbara Burdich Publishers, Opladen&Farmington
Hills
Matsuzato, K. (ed.) 2005: Emerging meso-areas in the former socialist countries: histories
revised or improvised? Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University
Matsuzato, K. 2001: “All Kuchma's Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the
Presidential Election of 1999”, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 42 (6):416-439 
 
Matsuzato, K. 2002: “Elite and the Party System of Zakarpattia Oblast: Relations among the
Levels of Party Systems in Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies , 54(8):1265-1299 
McFaul M. 2002: “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative
Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics, 54 (2), 212-244.
7
Merkel, W. 2004: “Embedded and Defective Democracies” Democratization, 11(5)
Merkel, W. Croissant A. 2000: "Formal institutions and informal rules in defective
democracies", POLIT VIERT, 41(1)
Merkel, W. Croissant, A. 2000: “Defective democracies: Concept and causes”. Central
European Political Science Review 1(2), 31–47.  
Morlino, L. 2009: “Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just
an optical illusion?”  European Political Science Review , 1(2), 273–296.
Schedler, A. (ed.) 2006: Electoral Auhtoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition,
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Ottaway, M. 2003: “Democracy challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism” Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
 
Wigell, M. 2008: “Mapping ‘‘hybrid regimes’’: regime types and concepts in comparative
politics”, Democratization 15(2): 230–250. 
Zimmer, K. 2008: Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Ukraine in: Mayer G. (ed.)
Formal Institutions and Informal Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Zinicker, H. 2009: “Regime-Hybridity in Developing Countries: Achievements and
Limitations of New Research on Transitions” International Studies Review 11 (2) 
8
